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Smart Connected Homes: Concepts, Risks, and Challenges

Joseph Bugeja

AGENDA




**Introduction and
Research Questions**




**Research
Methodology**



Future Work



Concepts




Contributions



INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

THESIS STRUCTURE



THESIS IN COMPUTER SCIENCE NO 2, LUNDUNIVERSITET

JOSEPH BUGEJA 
**SMART CONNECTED HOMES:
CONCEPTS, RISKS, AND
CHALLENGES**



INTRODUCTION

“Wireless cameras within a device such as the fridge may record the movement of suspects and owners”

-- Mark Stokes (2017)

(Head of Scotland Yard's digital, forensics, and cyber communications)





Image: Getty

INTRODUCTION

What is the motivation of this thesis?

- Interest over time according to Google trends since 2008 for the term Smart Home




- Total number of publications appearing in Google Scholar for the term Smart Home

INTRODUCTION

What is the motivation of this thesis?

- The amount of connected devices in use is estimated to increase from 11 billion in 2018 to 20 billion by 2020 (Gartner Inc., 2017)
- The amount of data collected by networked devices is anticipated to increase from 2.5 quintillion bytes of data/day to 40 yottabytes by 2020 (Wang et al., 2015)





Smart home devices and data

Wang, L., & Ranjan, R. (2015). Processing Distributed Internet of Things Data in Clouds. *IEEE Cloud Computing*, 1–5.

INTRODUCTION

What is the motivation of this thesis?

- Your smart home devices may jeopardize your security and privacy in multiple ways



2014

“Peeping into 73,000 unsecured security cameras thanks to default passwords”

Source: <https://goo.gl/pNKEAC>

2016

“A hacker could crank up the temperature of a smart thermostat to a sweltering 99 degrees”

Ransomware PoC FTW!

#Defcon24 #wargames @IoTville



Hackers demonstrated first ransomware for IoT thermostats at DEF CON

Source: <https://goo.gl/EoxCAZ>

2017

New – Turn on the lamp
Will it rain tomorrow?
New – Play a Pop station on Pandora
Set an alarm for eight a.m.
New – How is traffic?
New – When do the Phoenix Suns play next?



“After hearing the anchor’s comment, their own devices also tried to order pricey dollhouses.”

Source: Chung, H., Iorga, M., Voas, J., & Lee, S. (2017). “Alexa, Can I Trust You?.” *IEEE Computer*, 1–5.



RESEARCH QUESTIONS

What are the research questions being answered in this thesis?

- ✓ **RQ1:** How can smart connected home devices and the data collected by them be categorized?

- ✓ **RQ2:** What security and privacy risks does the introduction of IoT technologies inside the home bring to the residents?

- ✓ **RQ3:** What are the characteristics and challenges in mitigating security and privacy risks in smart connected homes?




CONCEPTS

SMART CONNECTED HOME

What is a smart connected home?

Smart home



Connected home



Smart connected home



SMART CONNECTED HOME

What is a smart connected home?


- Essentially, a smart connected home leverages IoT technologies to improve the quality and efficiency of life to the residents



Image: Shutterstock

SMART CONNECTED HOME

What is the generic architecture of a smart connected home?




Note: WAN, LAN, NAN, HAN, PAN, BAN, and WSN correspond to wide area, local area, neighbourhood area, home area, personal area, body area, and wireless sensor networks respectively

SECURITY AND PRIVACY GOALS


What are the main objectives of security and privacy?

- Information security key objectives are to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of assets
- Privacy deals with the protection of user's personal information from unauthorized entities



PRIVACY RISK SCENARIO

- Risk that a hacker gets unauthorized access to the camera feeds through an IP camera facilitating a house break-in



MANAGING SECURITY AND PRIVACY

- Managing information security and privacy effectively requires a thorough understanding of the smart connected home



Who are the threat agents interested in the home?



What are the existing mitigations?



What are the devices?



What are the risks?




What are the data?



RESEARCH METHODOLOGY


PAPER OVERVIEW

- ✓ Exploring the relationship between the different papers and corresponding research areas



RESEARCH DESIGN

✓ We adopted primarily an exploratory research approach but leverage also positivist strategies



SOME TECHNICAL CHALLENGES

- ✘ Shortage of IoT open vulnerability databases allowing for quantitative analysis

- ✘ Lack of dedicated datasets that identify the full technical specification of devices

- ✘ Existing models are not aligned well to actual smart home setups



CONTRIBUTIONS


MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

- i. A taxonomy and quantitative analysis of devices in smart connected homes

- ii. An analysis and classification of data collected by smart connected homes

- iii. A threat agent model for the smart connected home

- iv. Identification of state-of-the-art security challenges and their mitigations in smart connected homes



MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS



- Taxonomy and quantitative analysis of smart home devices

Paper V
Risk management foundations

RQ1
Categorization of data and devices

RQ2
Security and privacy risks

RQ3
Characteristics and challenges



MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS




Paper V
Risk management foundations

- Generic capabilities of smart home devices

RQ1
Categorization of data and devices

RQ2
Security and privacy risks

RQ3
Characteristics and challenges




MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

Paper VI

Risk management foundations



- Data types for the smart connected home



MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

- Data collection model for the smart connected home

Paper VI
Risk management foundations 

Data category	Collection mode	Collection method	Collection phase
Contact information	Explicit	Website form, service	System setup
Device information	Implicit, explicit	Smart home device, end-user device	System operation, sync process
Personal and account details	Explicit	Website form, service	System setup
User activity data	Implicit, explicit	Sensors, service	System operation, sync process
Configuration settings	Explicit	Website form, cookies, service	System setup
Location information	Implicit, explicit	Smart home device, end-user device	System operation
Financial information	Explicit	Website form, service	Purchase process
Environmental data	Implicit	Sensors	System operation
User-generated content	Explicit	Surveys, feedback form, support ticket	System operation, troubleshooting process
Offline data	Implicit, explicit	Paper, digital	Offline

RQ1


Categorization of data and devices

RQ2

Security and privacy risks

RQ3

Characteristics and challenges




MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

- Threat agent model for the smart connected home

Paper III
Security and privacy analysis

- RQ1**
Categorization of data and devices
- RQ2**
Security and privacy risks
- RQ3**
Characteristics and challenges



MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

- Threat agent model for the smart connected home



Paper III



Security and privacy analysis

Threat Agent	Typical Compromise Methods	
	Security	Privacy
Nation states	Attack a communication device, e.g. home router, to disrupt or corrupt smart home services (availability)	Attack on sensors, e.g. cameras, to eavesdrop communication of adversaries
Terrorists	Attack an actuator, e.g. insulin pump, to inject medication, possibly overdosing a patient (integrity)	N/A
Competitors and Organized Crime	Attack a smart appliance, e.g. refrigerator, to help grow a criminally-funded botnet (integrity) Attack a device firmware to get a competitor's software (confidentiality)	Attack on sensors, e.g. microphones, to snoop on private conversations
Hackers	Attack a smart home network to disrupt its services (availability)	Attack the smart home network resources to intercept sensitive communication
Thieves	Attack a smart home alarm system to rob a house (availability)	Attack a smart home hub to detect when the residents are away
Hackers	Attack a smart home network to gather information, e.g. credentials, about the user (confidentiality)	Attack a smart home device, e.g. a baby monitor, to cause chaos

RQ1

Categorization of data and devices

RQ2

Security and privacy risks

RQ3

Characteristics and challenges



MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

Paper IV

Security and privacy analysis



- Vulnerability assessment of smart connected cameras

RQ1

Categorization of data and devices

RQ2

Security and privacy risks

RQ3

Characteristics and challenges



SHODAN

62. [REDACTED]

Property Name	Value
area_code	null
asn	AS6830
city	Gelsenkirchen
country_code	DE
country_code3	DEU
country_name	Germany
data.0._shodan.crawler	264b5a9d15a64f96a4768e9d8081t
data.0._shodan.id	null
data.0._shodan.module	rtsp-tcp
data.0.data	RTSP/1.0 200 OK CSeq: 1 Server: Hipcam RealServer/V1.0 Public: OPTIONS,DESCRIBE,SETUP,TEARDOWN,PLAY,SET_PARAMETER,GET_PARAMETER
data.0.domains	['unitymediagroup.de']

ip	1049610876
ip_str	62.143.202.124
isp	Unitymedia
last_update	2018-03-20T19:29:37.676273
latitude	51.5221
longitude	7.0575
org	Unitymedia
os	null
ports	[554]
postal_code	45883
region_code	07



MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS


- Vulnerability assessment of smart connected cameras

Paper IV

Security and privacy analysis



542,270 devices, mostly IoT security cameras, were running “uc-httpd” (Nov 2017)



RQ1

Categorization of
data and devices

RQ2

Security and
privacy risks

RQ3

Characteristics and
challenges



SHODAN



MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

Paper IV

Security and privacy analysis



- Vulnerability assessment of smart connected cameras

RQ1

Categorization of
data and devices

RQ2

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privacy risks

RQ3

Characteristics and
challenges



SHODAN

Critical

CVE-2015-2887

- Video baby monitor
- Complete compromise of security and privacy

High

CVE-2007-5213

- Home camera
- Perform tasks with full privileges

Medium

CVE-2011-5261

- Small business camera
- Unauthorized modification of data

MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

- Security and privacy mitigations

Paper II
State-of-the-art of smart homes

DEVICE

- H/W encryption
- Fail-secure design
- Device authorization
- Enhanced algorithms
- Secure platforms
- CC and EMVCo IC SE

COMMUNICATION

- VPN
- Firewalls
- IDS/IPS
- TOR-based systems
- Dedicated devices
- Guidelines

SERVICE

- Security testing
- Secure design
- Data masking
- Cryptographic schemes
- Security organizations
- Open guidelines

RQ1

Categorization of
data and devices

RQ2

Security and
privacy risks

RQ3

Characteristics and
challenges




MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

- Security and privacy challenges

Paper II
State-of-the-art of smart homes

- RQ1**
Categorization of data and devices
- RQ2**
Security and privacy risks
- RQ3**
Characteristics and challenges





FUTURE WORK

FUTURE WORK

- ✓ **User controllable privacy artifact:** Designing a component (e.g., similar to a light dimmer) that allows residents the option to tune their privacy preferences
- ✓ **Proactive networking security approaches:** Network-based solution, working similar to an Intrusion Detection System, that complements existing security mechanisms
- ✓ **Smart connected home formal model:** Capturing the description of a generic and more secure and privacy-preserving smart connected home in a formal model





Thank you

for your

Attention !