


INTRODUCTION

- The home is the place where intimacy and reserve are expected.
- Internet-connected devices are resulting in potential for abuse, misuse, and appropriation of user data.
- This paper: Proposes a model that can be used for the systematic identification and modeling of privacy threats affecting smart homes.
- Problems with existing works....
 - Narrow scope:** Challenging to apply to realistic use-cases.
 - Model shortage:** Lack of a standard model that focuses on the home.
 - Shallow analysis:** Privacy threats are identified without any formal basis.

BACKGROUND

- Privacy is defined as the appropriateness of information flows.*



- Leveraging the theory of Contextual Integrity* as an overarching framework.

* Nissenbaum, Helen. "Privacy as contextual integrity." Wash. L. Rev. 79 (2004): 119.

METHODS

- Blackbox modelling and abstract notation for describing the smart connected home.
- High-order logic and functions are created for the identification of privacy threats.
- The identification of threats is based on Ziegeldorf et al.* work on information privacy.

+ Ziegeldorf, Jan Henrik, Oscar Garcia Morchon, and Klaus Wehrle. "Privacy in the Internet of Things: threats and challenges." Security and Communication Networks 7.12 (2014): 2728-2742.


HOME AND PRIVACY THREATS

- The smart connected home is represented as a 6-tuple system:
 - H , House, is the physical building which the residents inhabit.
 - N , Nodes, is a set of physical components of the smart connected home space.
 - U , Users, is a set of human users interacting with the smart connected home.
 - L , Links, is a set of communication channels between the nodes and users.
 - D , Data, is a set of data being collected and processed by the smart connected home setup.
 - P , Policy, is a set of rules describing how data are transmitted between the different entities.
- For the privacy threats, we created 6 primitives and 7 logical formulas to support their identification, given a particular smart home configuration.

Primitives/ Formulas	$\Phi_{dp,d_i}^a, \theta_{dp,d_i}^a, \gamma^n, perms_{dp,d_i}^a, read_{dp,d_i}^a, write_{dp,d_i}^a$
	$\hat{=} \forall p \in P, \exists (dp_i \ll \emptyset) \wedge (\Phi_{dp,d_i}^a = \text{true})$
	$\hat{=} \exists (l \in L) \wedge (\Phi_{dp,d_i}^a = \text{true}) \wedge write_{dp,d_i}^a$
	$\hat{=} \forall p \in P, \exists (dp_i \ll \emptyset) \wedge (\theta_{dp,d_i}^a = \text{true})$
	$\hat{=} \forall l_i, l_r \in L \wedge (l_i \ll l_r) \wedge (read_{dp,d_i}^a \wedge read_{dp,d_r}^a \Rightarrow read_{dp,d_{(i,r)}}^a) \wedge (read \notin perms_{dp,d_{(i,r)}}^a)$
	$\hat{=} \exists (l \in L) \wedge (u \in U) \wedge read_{dp,d_i}^a \wedge (read \notin perms_{dp,d_i}^a)$
	$\hat{=} \exists (n \in N) \wedge (\gamma^n = \text{true})$
	$\hat{=} \exists (l \in L) \wedge (u \in U) \wedge write_{dp,d_i}^a \wedge (write \notin perms_{dp,d_i}^a)$

PRIVACY-CENTERED SYSTEM MODEL

- A graphical illustration of the proposed model alongside the privacy threats that it can identify.




- Identification
 - Profiling
 - Localization and tracking
 - Linkage
 - Privacy-violating interaction and presentation
 - Inventory attacks
 - Lifecycle transitions
- Threat does not exist
 Threat is a potential future threat
 Threat is present

- Support for the automatic detection of privacy threats through logical formulas.
- Device and service agnostic.
- Model is scalable and extensible.

AMBIENT-ASSISTED LIVING USE-CASE

- An instantiation of the privacy-centered system model in a setup involving the home owner who can unlock a door using voice as input, and remotely through a smartphone.



- House, $H = \{house\}$
- Nodes, $N = \{doorbell, lock, speaker, manufacturer, smartphone\}$
 $C(speaker).capabilities = \{gateway, storage, processing, interaction\}$
 $B(manufacturer) = cloud$
- Users, $U = \{owner\}$
- Links, $L = \{doorbell_speaker, lock_speaker, speaker_cloud, cloud_smartphone, owner_smartphone, owner_speaker\}$
- Data, $D = \{(lock_status, system, lock\ open/close, indefinite), (video, visitor, video\ of\ guest(s), purpose), (audio, owner, voice\ interaction, purpose)\}$
- Policy, $P = \{(doorbell_speaker, \{(video, \{read\}\}), doorbell, speaker, \emptyset\}, (lock_speaker, \{(lock_status, \{read\}\}), lock, speaker, \emptyset\}, (speaker_cloud, \{(audio, \{read\}\}), speaker, manufacturer, Time = \{8:00 - 24:00\} \wedge Location = \{house\}\}, (cloud_smartphone, \{(cmd, \{read\}\}), smartphone, manufacturer, \emptyset\}, (owner_smartphone, \{(cmd, \{read\}\}), owner, smartphone, \emptyset\}, (owner_speaker, \{(audio, \{read\}\}), owner, speaker, \emptyset\})$

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

- IoT technologies deployed inside the home challenge the long-held notion that the home is a private, protected, and intimate place.
- We contributed in adding more more transparency about risks emerging out of smart homes.
- Our privacy-centered system model helps in the identification and modelling of privacy threats.
- For future work:
 - Evaluate the completeness of the proposed model through empirical studies.
 - Express the system model using a formal specification language.
 - Leverage the model for performing quantitative risk analysis.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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